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Parental Duties 
Toward Severely Impaired Infants: 
An Ethical Analysis 
Stephen G. Post, Ph.D. 
This paper comes ./i"om a 1986 summer seminar on .. Principles and 
Meraphors in Biomedical Ethics" al Ihe Unil'ersitl' o( Virginia. 
Parents, ground down in some cases by the stresses of caring for their 
seve rely impaired child. may decide to turn their offspring over to a state 
agency or a private group . In doing so. do parents violate their moral 
responsibilities? These situations raise profound questions about the 
moral responsibilities of parents which. as the Carnegie Council on 
Children writes. "society has never solved ."] The fact that parents are 
allowed to surrender their children under a variety of circumstances does 
not make thi·s a moral practice. With the rise of child advocacy 
movements. the moral challenge placed upon parents by a medical 
technology that gives life to infants who in other eras would have died in 
accord with the balance of nature . and the growing recognition that 
seriously impaired children generally develop better in the atmosphere of 
love and security which a family provides. rather than in large institutions. 
the time for moral deliberation is upon us . What is the 'bas is of parental 
responsibility in these cases. and what are the limits of responsibility. if 
any? 
I - Parental Responsibility? A Historical Backdrop 
Before responding to this vexing question . it is helpful to place it in 
historical context. This is because major voices in the current debate . 
particularly those which emphasize children's rights and expanded 
correlative parental duties. are reacting to centuries of child neglect in the 
West. Just as the feminist voice in ethical debate is best appreciated in the 
light of historical inequalities. so also the movement for children's 
libe ration can best be understood with history in mind. 
Traditionally. children have had ve ry little moral status; they have . by 
and large. been treated as personal property to be discarded for reasons of 
parental convenience. As William A. Silverman writes: 
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On the whole. parents have acted on the assumption that each baby is a 
personal possess ion and that they are the ones to decide whether to invest the 
economic and psyc hological reso urces needed for the transformation of their 
completely de penden t biologic crea tion into an independent soc ial being. ' 
Children , with few exceptions , have been treated with relative indifference, 
for most parents believed, like Montaigne, that they "have neither mental 
activities nor recognizable bodily shape."J Westerners who have, in this 
century, granted children the moral status offull persons , would do well to 
realize that the veneer of civility is only a thin one, under which lurks what 
some suggest is an innate tendency toward infanticide 4 As Philippe Aries 
has shown in his history of Western childhood , "This feeling of 
indifference towards a too fragile childhood is not really very far removed 
from the callousness of the Roman or Chinese societies which practiced 
the exposure of newborn children."5 Indeed , the history of infanticide in 
the West is a long and tragic one which reached, even as late as the 19th 
century, epidemic proportions." 
Precarious Life 
If life for healthy children was precarious , all the more so for those with 
impairme nts . These children were often understood as "changelings," i.e. , 
creations of the devil rather than of God, who should be beaten to death in 
the hopes tha t the devil would return the real child 7 Impaired children 
were viewed, as Robert F. Weir has written, to be "supernatural substitutes 
or 'demon-children' who had taken the place of 'rear children ."x The only 
recourse for parents was to "bea t the devil out" of the child, destroying it in 
the process . Even Martin Luther, who had some progressive notions of 
parental responsibility, counseled the parents of a retarded 12-year-old 
child to throw it offa bridge into the water below.9 lfparental destruction 
of healthy neonates and bastards was as rampant as the historians suggest. 
it was surely all the worse for infants born with impairmep ts. Parents rid 
themselves of these subhuman beings as soon as possible . 
How is it that the West has gradually affirmed moral status for children 
and enlarged its notion of parental obligations? Here the historians are in 
agreement that Christianity took the lead in gradually establishing "a 
social policy aimed at limiting parental autonomy with respect to off-
spring ... "10 There are severa l prominent aspects of Christian teaching 
which have , over the course of time and despite setbacks, brought children 
into the moral community. 
First and foremost. Christian consciousness includes children within the 
community of persons. Specifically, Christ declared that adults can enter 
the kingdom of heaven only by becoming as little children. It is evident that 
Christ had a high sense of the dignity of the child. and was displeased by 
those who followed Him for failing to value children as He did. Thus . the 
following words of Christ which have done as much as any others in the 
West to upgrade the status of the child: 
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And they brought young children to Him, that He should touch them: and His 
disciples rebuked those that bro ught them. But when Jesus saw it , He was 
much displeased , and sa id unto them, 'Suffer the little chi ldren to come unto 
Me, and forbid them not : for of such is the kingdom of God. Verily ( say unto 
you , whosoever shall not receive the kingdom of God as a little child. he shall 
not enter therein.' And He took them up in His arms, put His hands upon 
them, and blessed them. (Mark, 10)" 
Just as modern Christian feminists take note of the presence of women 
such as Mary Magdalene among the followers of Christ , and point out 
how the male disciples were deeply troubled by this affirmation of women, 
so also those who advocate children's rights can make use of the teachings 
of Christ. 12 Christ did not prescribe details of parental obligation, but He 
successfully inspired parents within the Christian community. 
Early Theologians' Reaction 
The early Christian theologians , in continuity with the dignity Christ 
bestowed upon children with His blessing, reacted powerfully against the 
practices of their surrounding Roman culture. Every human being, they 
insisted , has a soul, and is therefore of inherent value- that was the vital 
argument. They asserted that children, having souls , were inviolable, to 
which religious doctrine probably more is due in the way of checking 
infanticide and encouraging parental responsibility than any other single 
idea. Earl E. Shelp, a philosopher rather than a theologian, in his analysis 
of the transition in Western culture from a child-denying to a child-
affirming culture which begins with the 17th century, remarks: "The 
growing influence of Christianity contributed to these changing 
perceptions and practices. The social implications of Christian teaching 
that children had immortal souls, just like adults, seemed finally to affect 
family life and child-rearing practices." ') Silverman makes the same point: 
"With the coming of Christianity, there was a specific theologic motivation 
for the importance of species membership: the belief that all born of 
human parents were immortal and destined for an et. rnity of bliss or 
everlasting torment."14 As a result of Christian influence, Roman laws 
governing infanticide were gradually revised, though only partially. The 
Church did not accomplish as much as it wanted. 
There are many passages from the early Christian theologians which are 
cited for their clear proscription against abortion and infanticide. There 
are also some interesting passages on parenthood which have, to my 
knowledge , been entirely overlooked in the contemporary literature. In the 
fourth century, for instance, Jerome wrote thus: 
(fthen parents are responsible for their children when these are of ripe age a nd 
independent . how much more must they be responsible for them when. still 
unweaned and weak. they cannot. in the Lord's words . 'disce rn between their 
right ha nd and their left'. " 
This heightened view of parenthood carries through the Christian 
theological tradition , and is echoed in Luther's prescription: "Then, if ever 
February, (987 63 
our dear God and Father in heaven grants you children, nurture and care 
for them, raise them up in the discipline, fear, and admonition of the 
Lord."16 Thomas Aquinas echoed the Christian call for parental 
responsibility as well when he argued that child-rearing is a part of the 
natural law to be discerned by the observation of animals. (Here he 
borrowed from the Stoic Ulpian). 
In the light of this historical background , the views of contemporary 
Christian medical ethicists become understandable. Catholic ethicist 
Charles J . McFadden, basing his position on natural law theory, writes, 
"The primary purpose of marriage includes not only the procreation of 
children but also their proper rearing. In this respect , man can learn much 
even from the animals in lower creation. Natural instinct compels the beast 
to exhibit a tender care and self-sacrificing solicitude for its young."17 
McFadden lists attention to bodily needs, but also intellectual, religious, 
and moral nature, as included among parental duties . Protestant ethicist 
Paul Ramsey also has a lofty conception of parental responsibility which 
rests on a set of assumptions about divine love. God, argues Ramsey, 
creates nothing apart from a love which is steadfast. Creation is linked 
with nurturing love on this theological level. Then, Ramsey suggests that 
when parents procreate, "There is a trace of the original mystery by which 
God created the world because of His love."18 That is , parents should link 
procreation with steadfast love for their children after the image of God. 
To procreate without assuming a relationship of love and loyalty with 
one's offspring is to fall short of Christian expectations. 
The West has struggled perennially with the question of parental 
responsibility and the correlative moral rights of children. As Lloyd 
de Mause has shown, Western attitudes toward children have shifted from 
infanticidal to ambivalent and only in this century, to "helpful."1 9 Other 
cultures, despite the practice of infanticide, have had a much more child-
centered world view than the West , which issues in a more nurturing 
parental ethics .20 The recent progress of the West can, in part. be attributed 
to the cultural impact of religious faith . Currently, the Cillristian attitude 
toward parental duties and the dignity of the child has spilled over into the 
discussion of seriously impaired infants. Stanley Hauerwas. for example. 
is right in suggesting that Christian parents try to view seriously impaired 
infants as "divine gifts" who teach the community to care.11 This morall y 
idealistic view of parental responsibilities may be a necessary one. in 
dialectic tension with the morally minimalist tendency of parents to 
discard impaired children for the sake of convenience. 
Parental Response to Severely Impaired Infants 
One of the most important aspects of moral argument is strictly 
descriptive: "What is going on?" How we draw the picture of a set of 
circumstances is itself a moral act insofar as inaccurate and reductive 
images inevitably lead to mediocre ethical analysis 21 Therefore. the first 
step in an examination of parental responsibilities for seriously impaired 
infants is an impartial consideration of parental attitudes. 
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On the one hand, there is a wealth of literature indicating that parents 
are relatively unstressed in caring for such infants. Surgeon General C. 
Everett Koop, M.D., known for his work in the surgical treatment of 
impaired newborns, writes the following: "I know what can be done with 
the child's family. I know that those children become loved and loving, 
that they are creative, and that their entrance into a family is frequently 
looked back upon in subsequent years as an extraordinarily positive 
experience."23 Koop bases this thoroughly optimistic statement on a study 
he made of 53 parents of infants on whom he operated for correction of 
esophageal atresia. Eighteen parents said that the infants had no impact on 
the family; 14 responded "mild and positive," 10 "strong and positive," 
seven "mild and negative," and two "strong and negative."24 Koop's 
conclusion is that having an impaired infant is , for most parents, a positive 
experience. This evidence, however, is not critically assessed by Koop. He 
does not, for example, question whether the parental responses might be 
defensive, for few parents are willing to reveal negative attitudes toward 
their children. In short, Kdop's study is hardly full-blown. 
I also have doubts about the conclusions drawn by Rosalyn Darling in 
her oft-quoted Families Against Society (1979) . Darling describes the 
stages of parental adjustment to a seriously impaired child , the first of 
which is "anomie," i.e ., a sense of helplessness in what appears to be an 
overwhelming tragedy. However, with support from family and friends , 
this stage can often be quite brief. Then parents are able to accept their 
child, especially as they learn that they are able to care for it adequately. 
Soon, parents learn that society- including pediatricians- does not share 
their attitude of acceptance. They therefore enter the "advocacy stage," in 
which they challenge social prejudices against the impaired. Darling 
argues that despite society and the problems which these infants pose for 
their parents, "in most cases the family seems to adjust to the difficulties ."25 
The families which fail to adjust are ones "that had serious personal or 
financial problems in addition to their handicapped child ."26 For the most 
part , impaired infants have a positive effect on families , maintains 
Darling: "If anything, the presence of such a child seems to draw family 
members closer together as an ingroup facing the hostilities of the outside 
world."27 Darling does acknowledge that the literature "cites families torn 
a part by the presence of a handicapped child ," but such families were 
already weak.28 
Some are Impacted 
There is absolutely no doubt that some parents and siblings are 
"positively" impacted in these cases. But literature which underlines the 
success stories and de-emphasizes the tragic realities of stress leading to 
"chronic sorrow" for parents ignores the complexity of reality. It is 
therefore ideological in the worst sense of the word .29 
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Literature Highlights Impact 
On the other hand, ther is a wealth of literature which highlights the 
nega tive impact of a se riously impaired child and its family. 3D Sandra L. 
Ha rris , for instance, reports that parents face relentless problems of 
burnout, fatigue, loss of free time, financial burden, a nd so forth. "Having 
a developmentally disabled child," she writes, "triggers a multitude of 
different, and often unpleasant , emotions in parents. Along with 
tenderness, love, and nurturance and deep-felt caring that is elicited by 
their child, there is also likely to be anger, disappointment, guilt, and other 
uncomfortable feelings ."31 S.E. Waisbren, to cite another example, 
compared the parents of yo ung impaired children with those of normal 
ba bies and found th a t the former viewed themselves and their children 
more negatively than the latter control group. 32 Other researchers have 
pointed out that parents of seriously impaired children may live in a state 
of "chronic so rrow," and that their divorce rates are very high. 33 
In my view, an ethical analysis of parental responsibilities must take 
these rea lities into account. Otherwise , based on the rather excessively 
optimistic literature, it is difficult to take parents seriously when they claim 
that they simply cannot care for their child anymore. It is necessary that we 
be reminded that modern technology, in saving the lives of severely 
impaired infants , has also extended the caring these lives require far 
beyo nd what parents knew in past generations. The biological balance has 
been altered, and with it the moral balance of the family as we have known 
it. As Hauerwas comments, "Our technologically expanded care has 
placed choices before us which seem inconsistent with our original 
intentions of care."34 
It must be kept in mind, then, that severely impaired infants disrupt the 
natural moral order, perhaps "extending a child's dependence beyond a 
parent's natural strength."35 Under ordinary circumstances, even healthy 
children exact a heavy commitment from parents, but they eventually 
grow independent and the demands taper off. Parents re/!a in some of the 
freedom they sacrificed to have children through this process. However, 
with the impaired child , such is no longer the case. As one mother puts it , 
as described by Helen Featherstone, "And when I project , all I see is a 
sleepy life of never-ending diaper changing for all of US ."36 
This is not to dispute the claim that some parents have a positive 
experience with their impaired child. As John A. Robertson has 
mentioned , one parent discovered altruistic emotions through caring for 
such a child: "In the last months I have come closer to people and can 
understand them more. I have met them more deeply."37 These accounts 
are both genuine and moving, though the actual response of such parents 
may, I suspect, be more complex than the testimonies indicate . My point 
here is simply to note that the picture of the parental situation that we draw 
must be a balanced one, for otherwise it makes no sense to consider the 
possible limits to parental obligation, nor to seriously envision the support 
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services such parents may require, given the lim its to altruism. To ignore 
this complexity is a moral mistake. 
III - Relinquishing Care: The Problem of Child Placement 
There remains one final picture to be drawn before ethical analysis can 
begin. When parents decide to relinquish care of their severely impaired 
child , are there alternative settings available in which such a child can 
develop as well as he or she would in the context of a loving fam ily? If 
satisfactory settings are unavailable, or if there really is no substitute 
setting which approximates the love and security a child receives in the 
family, then whatever limits to parental responsibility we can discern 
philosophically will surely be tempered. 
In fact, there is a clear consensus among social service professiona ls and 
developmental psychologists that child ren with disabilities are better off in 
a family or family-like setting. The Department of Health and Human 
Services has recently reported that impaired children "are more likely to 
achieve their maximum potential residing in small facilities which provide 
them with the opportunity to participate more fully in the normal life of 
the community rather than in institutions . " J~ There is a clear trend in the 
direction of deinstitutionalization, i.e., "the integration of handicapped 
persons into the community, as opposed to their placement in institutional 
residences."J9 Thus, most current literature indicates that the institution-
versus-family-and-community-debate has been convincingly settled in 
favor of the latter. 4o 
As a result of this trend away from institutionalization , most states 
emphasize, at least on paper, a commitment to expanding family support 
services. New York State, for instance, has issued a recent report which 
begins thus: "Families are clearly the primary providers of care. An intact 
family offers stability , consistency, and close relationships which cannot 
be duplicated, as well as provides basic support. shelter, food. and 
attention to health care. Like other people, the qttality of life for 
developmentally disabled people is at its best when they can live in their 
home."41 The goal of the New York State Office of Mental Retardation 
and Developmental Disabilities , then , is to reduce family stress, i.e., "to 
strengthen the family's ability to care for a developmentally disabled 
family member in the family's home . "4~ As a result. New York is 
concentrating on providing respite care as a means of temporary relief for 
families, caregiver training. sibling services such as education and 
counseling, community recreation for the disabled, and so forth . It is 
difficult to imagine a more thorough reversal of past policies. when 
impaired children were typically institutionalized. 
Most states, in addition to offering family support systems, also provide 
alternative family-like settings. Group homes have come into existence, 
though more are needed . Located in residential neighborhoods and 
professionally or para professionally staffed, these homes may house from 
several to a dozen or more disabled children in an atmosphere which only 
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imperfectly approximates the homelike. In addition, there has been a trend 
toward individualized foster care. In 1982, for example, the Chimes 
Program was initiated in Baltimore to train foster parents to care for 
seriously impaired infants and young children. The Family Care Program 
of California began a foster care program for such children in 1968, and it 
has been remarkably successful. Ann Coyne has documented the successes 
of the Lancaster Office of Mental Retardation in Nebraska with regard to 
recruiting foster care. Each week, an impaired child needing foster care 
was introduced to the community through the local newspaper, and the 
commun ity responded with volunteers. 43 Finally, there has been some 
progress in the area of adoption. At the forefront has been Spaulding for 
Children. The Child Welfare League of America has also been active in 
finding adoptive parents for children with impairments.44 
Parents' Choices 
Nevertheless, parents often are faced with the choice of keeping their 
child or giving it up for insti~utionalization. This is because the alternative 
services listed above are not readily available. As Madeline H. Kimmish 
has reported in her America's Children. Who Cares.?, since 1981 the federal 
role in children's services has been reduced. The 1985 budget "included 
significant cuts in children's programs, specifically education for the 
handicapped ... . 45 While donations from the private sector have 
increased, the provision of human services to needy children and their 
families has been seriously hampered. Due to reduced economic 
commitment, many states have not been able to develop satisfactory 
alternative family-like settings. Indeed. many family support services are 
forced to charge rather heavy fees now. We may do well to remind 
ourselves of the words of Daniel Patrick Moynihan: "A commonplace of 
political rhetoric is that the quality of a civilization may be measured by 
how it cares for its elderly. Just as surely. the future of a society may be 
forecast by how it cares for its young."46 The movement to establish 
alternatives to institutionalization is succeeding gradtally. but these 
options mentioned are available only for a restricted number of children. 
More can and should be done . 
Parents . then. even in "chronic sorrow." are often forced to continue 
caring for their child because they know that the only sure alternative is the 
large state institution. Realizing that this is hardly fair to their child. they 
may retain custody and do their best. despite their sense of having reached 
their limits. Parents may want to relinquish care. and they may have moral 
reasons for doing so. but because the opt ions are few they are willing to 
endure greater stress than should be expected of them. 
IV - An Ethical Analysis 
"How are we to understand and live our lives." asks Daniel Callahan. 
"when the moral demands made upon us seem to require more than we can 
give, more than we can make sens.e of. and - in our society at least - more 
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than commands much respect and admiration?" Callahan raises this 
question in response to the trend "to return to families and the home the 
long-term care of the chronically ill and those in need of rehabilitation."48 
In particular, Callahan doubts the assumption that with "some modest 
degree of social support", families will have the moral and psychological 
strength to be caregivers. He acknowledges that some families may find 
provision of care to be a rewarding experience, but notes that families also 
experience feelings of oppression and guilt, for "the caregiver is often 
trapped in a way of life not chosen and a future direction not of his or her 
own." Technology keeps people alive for ever-longer periods of time, and 
these people need to be cared for. What is to be done? Is the answer to 
widen the scope of family care? Just how much caring can we expect 
parents to do? 
For all that I have written about the dignity of the child, the correlative 
duties of parents, and the family or family-like setting children require, I 
do not accept the notion that parental responsibilities for severely 
impaired newborns are unlimited. Indeed, I think the policy of returning 
persons in need of long-term care, especially infants , to the family must be 
examined most carefully. Parents and families are not morally 
inexhaustible, though some policy-makers assume the contrary. Tech-
nology has upset the natural moral balance and imposed burdens fit for a 
society of saints; but we are not all saints, even in the parental role. It is 
high time medical ethicists began to consider the problem of the 
technological expansion of care in systematic terms , for it may be the 
crucial problem of our times. Indeed , if this trend continues, it may be that 
onlya religious ethic with a strong sense of unconditional care and radical 
self-denial as moral vocations can sustain us . But there is little likelihood of 
such an ethic being generally accepted. Thus , we are at something of an 
impasse. 
On the one hand, we as a society can aim at improved social support 
systems for the family, as the State of New York is attemp~ng to do. But on 
the other hand, the moral claim of others puts us, to use a metaphor, on a 
leash of imperative duties which are simply beyond the forms of morality 
that we as a society know of. Here I am in agreement with Daniel 
Callahan's rather pessimistic conclusions: 
At one level. what I am saying points in the direction of improved systems of 
social support for those who care for famil y members . They need financial and 
psychological support of sta te and federal agencies. and they need responsive, 
sens iti ve people to give them help and to give them respite . But that is hardly 
enough. At another level. we need another kind of society and another kind of 
morality49 
Callahan suggests that only religious cultures embody the VISIOns of 
sacrifice and community of which I write, and those who are not believers 
are left "with a severe problem." As he concludes, "I am not certain, but 
until we do [create a secular version of a way of life that fully shares 
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burdens] I think we should be wary of asking families to undertake heroic 
sacrifices. "50 
Crucial Question for Ethical Analysis 
The crucia l question, given this framework , for ethical analysis is the 
following: Are there limits to the duty of beneficence on the part of parents 
toward their needy impaired children? To resolve this dilemma, it is 
necessary to consider the basis of parental duties, and whether the 
distinction between obligatory acts of beneficence and supererogation 
holds in the family as it does in the wider society. If the latter distinction 
does hold , then there are some actions which we cannot expect parents to 
perform other than voluntarily, for these actions lie beyond the call of duty. 
My contention is that, in fact, the distinction between the morally 
obligatory and the supererogatory does hold in the family , although the 
line of demarcation between the two is raised higher than is the case 
outside of "special relations," i.e. , in the wider public sphere of morality 
between strangers. This contention is not one which will be accepted by 
those who consider the family a community of absolutely steadfast love 
that satisfies all needs . I grant that family members must be ready to care 
for one another at considerable inconvenience, and that breaches of 
faithfulness in the family should be viewed with disdain under anything 
like ordinary circumstances. But there are limits even in the family. Thus, I 
disagree with Alan Donagan's comment that, "Except for special 
institutional duties, for example, those of a parent, to promote the well-
being of others at the cost of one's life or fundamental well-being would be 
supererogatory."51 If theologian James M. Gustafson means, with his 
statement that "In family life self-denial is not a supererogatory norm; it is 
a moral necessity for common life", that sacrifice in the family is unlimited, 
then I disagree with him as well, though I suspect that Gustafson does have 
some limits in mind .52 We can expect morally inspiring forms of self-denial 
in the family, but se lf-denia l must be distinguished from ; elf-immolation. 
In order to substantiate my proposition, I will first examine the 
distinction between obligatory acts and supererogation, placing special 
emphasis on the association of the latter with freedom. Most philosophers 
grant that there are duties of beneficence. Common morality teaches us 
that if a pedestrian sees a child about to walk out in front of a school bus , 
the pedestrian ought to lay a hand on the child's arm and prevent the 
tragedy. This act is done without any danger to the pedestrian , and the 
benefit to the child is enormous. It fulfills all the conditions for the duty of 
beneficence which are spelled out by James Childress and Tom 
Beauchamp: the child is at risk of significant loss or damage; the 
pedestrian's action is needed to prevent this loss ; the pedestrian's action 
will prevent the loss; the pedestrian's action would not present significant 
risk to the pedestrian, and finally , the benefit that the child will probably 
gain far outweighs any harm the pedestrian is likely to suffer 5 .1 
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However, if the child is already out in the middle of the street and the 
school bus is closing in fast , there is no duty for the pedestrian to leap out 
and push the child to the side when he or she knows that the result will be 
his or her own death. Such an act is beyond the call of duty, and though 
morally praiseworthy, it cannot be required of the pedestrian. This act is 
thus supererogatory, i.e. , the act is morally good, done for the sake of 
another, and places the moral agent at grave risk .54 
Distinctions Between Duty/Supererogation 
The distinction we make between duty and supererogation on the level 
of common morality means , as J.O. Urmson has put it, that we are not 
required to be "saints and heroes."55 It would be a moral outrage, insists 
Urmson, "to apply pressure" on anyone to do such a deed as sacrificing his 
or her life for others .56 While we can expect persons to fulfill their duties 
and penalize themselves if they fail, heroic acts of self-sacrifice are strictly a 
matter of personal choice. ~illard Schumaker establishes the same point: 
acts of supererogation are, like charity or grace, "free gifts" or favors which 
cannot be compelied Y Supererogatory acts are done voluntarily and 
freely chosen. It makes no sense to coerce someone to give a gift , for gifts 
are by definition left up to the agent to give or withhold. It can thus be said 
that freedom is the mother of supererogatory virtue, as it is for all acts of 
altruistic love. 
One of the most famous cases of supererogation in recent American 
history is that of a man whose plane crashed into the wintry Potomac 
River. He, a mere passenger with no special duties or stations, helped 
dozens of people out of the icy waters without the slightest thought for 
himself. Finally, he was overcome by the cold and died. The nation was 
inspired by this heroism, largely because it was undertaken freely and lies 
far beyond what we would ordinarily think required. 
Granted , there are occasions when, because a particular individ ual has 
taken a specific role in life , we can expect heroism. , A lifeguard, for 
example, is expected to risk his or her life by swimming off into the sea 
after hearing cries for help . A fireman is, by virtue of his station in life, 
expected to take risky actions to save others. In these cases , the distinction 
between moral duty and supererogation breaks down. Can the same be 
said for parenthood? 
Distinction Holds Up 
It is clear from ordinary language that, in fact, the distinction between 
duty and supererogation does hold up within the family. We do speak of 
"saintly" parents who endure tremendous stress without complaint. 
Parents are understood to have inclinations or interests other than caring 
for their children such that when they refuse to make certain sacrifices they 
are not morally blamed. Parents bring children into the world knowing 
that their responsibilities are substantial. However, they do not bring 
children into the world with radical forms of self-denial in mind. If they did 
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so, then the birth of a severely impaired child would be cause for 
celebration. Parents do not opt for a future in which all of their central 
interests will be displaced. Few of us would want to suggest that our 
children hold a blank check, though they do hold a large one . 
Permit me to make use of a metaphor to underscore this argument. 
Children have obvious rights based on their needs, for example. rights to 
food , shelter, education, and psychological nurturance. But for every 
right, there is a correlative parental obligation. Therefore. the metaphor of 
a leash has been suggested by William Aiken and Hugh LaFollette as an 
apropriate way to view this correiation 5K The right holder has the other -
in this case the parent - on a leash. Under relatively normal circumstances. 
parents willingly and without serious threat to themselves hang onto this 
leash until the child reaches adulthood . However. sometimes the pull of 
the leash is so strong and burdensome that the holder must simply let go. 
Some holders will hang on, come what ma y. for they are willing to endure 
poss ibly great damage to themselves . Surely. though. we do not fault a 
person for, as a matter of last resort. releasing the leash. 
The distinction between duty and supererogation is also borne out by 
our response to parents who are unexpectedly faced with caring for a 
severely impaired infant. Certain Christians might view such circumstances 
in highly positive terms . given their theological notion that suffering and 
unconditional love are the most lofty ethical ideals. And no doubt 
parents, who themselves have adjusted to such a life of care. might view 
these circumstances with relative delight. However. most of us feel uneasy 
when we see parents asked to sacrifice their "selfhood" and future for the 
sake of another. Displays of moral idealism are inspiring. of course. but 
generally we feel grateful that we ourselves have been spared such 
demands. We wonder what we would do in a sim ilar situation. and often 
think that such care would be understandably beyond us . 
Even as parents. our common morality is rooted in some sense of the 
transcendence of the individual over the communitY, in this case. the 
community of the family . The autonomy of the self is viewed as a good. 
and even a supreme good. When we are faced with d ifficult ies that require 
long-term radical self-sacrifice. our ethic of moral autonomy does not 
suffice. Our image of human fulfillment is independent selfhood. and our 
sense of demanding care is quite limited. When forced to end ure suffering. 
even in the family. we often turn against each other. Included within our 
ethics of autonomy is a proscription against involuntary self-denial. 
Blustein's Comments 
I n one of the few contemporary works on the ethics of the family. Jeffrey 
Blustein makes several comments which are in accord with the view 
suggested here. Blustein writes: "To be acceptable. a childrearing practice 
should not force parents to choose between duty and interest but should 
accommodate both the needs of children and the legitimate non-parental 
interests of parents."59 He also remarks that "Parents whose own interests 
72 Linacre Quarterly 
must always be sacrificed to those of their children are likely to end up not 
satisfied but miserable and resentful."60 The fact that parents are inevitably 
on a leash does not mean that the pull upon them can or should be total. 
If what I have suggested is true, then it would be seemingly useful to 
develop some moral calculus to balance the interests of parents against 
seve rely impaired children. But this is an exceedingly difficult task, and 
one which may be all but impossible. The most I can do is offer some rules 
of thumb. For instance , if a mother refuses the option of sustained self-
denial in radical form on the basis of her appeal to self-identity, such 
refusal should not be dismissed. After all, countless psychologists have 
argued that if a person has no proper love of self, that person cannot 
satisfactorily love others. My major thrust , however, is not to develop a 
calculus, but only to establish the moral credibility of parents who , despite 
a certain amount of social support, simply refuse to live a life of 
supererogation. It must be recognized that circumstances do arise in which 
caring for a severely impaired child presents a significant risk to parents , 
and it is not clear that the pro bable gain for the child outweighs the harm 
done to the parents. 
At this point , a case study will help to clarify some of the ideas 
highlighted in the above: 
Mrs. Anderson is suffe rin g from se rious depress ion. with su icidal ideation. 
Her yea r-old infant da ughter. Betsy. is seve rely impa ired . Though the fa mil y 
has received some financial re li ef. Betsy remai ns a major phys ica l a nd 
eco nomic dra in . Mrs. Anderso n is wo rried about her husband . who is 
working two full-time jobs a nd says that he has had it. The two teenage 
daughters are co ncerned about their own futures. Despite the help of a 
support g rou p. Mrs. Anderson cries much of the time. She is too tired to enjo y 
anything. a nd feels isolated. She has to ld a soc ial wo rk er a t the hosp it a l. where 
Betsy is rece iving ye t another operation . that the Anderso ns will never take 
Betsy home aga in . 
Here is a case in which the parents of Betsy have been asked to sacrifice too 
much by an y ordinary standards. Even if they once had dete rmined to care 
for Betsy as a matter of duty, they have been unable to sustain that 
commitment emotionally. In this case , because of the seriousness of the 
Andersons' plight , Betsy does not possess a moral trump card that 
mandates a preference for her interests at the ex pense of others. 
v - Concluding Remarks 
In arguing that parents can morally refuse to continue caring for a 
seriously impaired child, I by no means want to suggest that the parents 
have a right to end their child's life. If history has taught us a nything, it is 
that children and childhood have for centuries been in need of liberation. 
That in recent years a children's rights move ment has emerged can only be 
applauded, for it represents progress. Once children were afforded no 
moral status, and impaired infants were quickly killed . Fortunately. and 
with the help of Christianity'S impact on the West, children are now highly 
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valued and the subject of many a learned volume. It is, I will assert, 
unfortunate that some medical ethicists look back on our tragic history 
and then argue that because parents have always rather easily engaged in 
infanticide, they should be allowed to do so now with impaired infants . 
Perhaps the worst offender here is Earl E. Shelp, who suggests that in the 
light of the historical record, infanticide is "regrettable but acceptable ."6! 
Moreover, I accept the moral principle that children have special claims on 
the basis of their unfulfilled needs. It is better to heed the United Nations 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child than the latest bit of pro-infanticide 
philosophy. That declaration reads as follows : "Principle 5. The child who 
is physically, mentally, or socially handicapped shall be given the special 
treatment, education, and care required by his particular condition."62 
The severely impaired child should, whenever possible , grow up under 
the care of loving parents. But there are many instances when parents, for 
good reason, want to relinquish care. It is a moral mistake for society to 
impose upon parents in this area, even though this is evidently a good way 
to save money. The family is simply not an endless source of moral 
heroism. The solution to the grave problem of the technological expansion 
of care will be a complex one which will require more imagination than is 
possessed by those who would place the burden and stress on parents who 
may well long for a previous era. 
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